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The breakdown of the WTO negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda has 
inspired critics to highlight the lack of effort on the part of rich countries to reform their 
agricultural policies. In this paper, we focus instead the poverty impacts of developing 
country tariff cuts – particularly those in agriculture. We argue that the Doha 
Development Agenda is fundamentally less poverty-friendly than it could be -- in large 
part due to the absence of tariff cuts on staple food products in developing countries. 
Such cuts would give the poor access to food at world prices, thereby reducing the cost of 
living at the poverty line. We also explore the contention that such tariff cuts will hurt the 
poor working in agriculture. Based on our analysis of the impacts of multilateral trade 
policy reforms on a sample of fifteen developing countries, we find there is some 
evidence of poverty increases in agriculture. However, such effects are minimized by 
ensuring that agricultural tariffs are cut in all developing countries. Overall, the poverty-
reducing impact of lower food prices dominates; we conclude that the Doha Development 
Agenda would be more poverty friendly if it were to include deeper cuts in developing 
country agricultural tariffs.  
 
Keywords: WTO, Poverty, Trade Liberalization, Doha Development Agenda, 
Agricultural Trade 
 
 Introduction and Motivation 
The World Trade Organization’s Doha Round of trade negotiations will be 
remembered for at least two characteristics. First, it was the first round to place 
development explicitly at the center of its business, as epitomized in its title “The Doha 
Development Agenda.” Second, it has revolved around agricultural trade liberalization to 
a much greater and more critical extent than any other round. These two bold innovations 
have certainly made negotiations more complex and sensitive and in the course of the 
five years’ negotiations to date they have come to be intimately connected in the public 
and political perceptions. Such a connection is undoubtedly warranted but we will argue 
that it has not always been correctly understood. Although the agricultural component of 
a successful Doha round would enhance development, in the process of balancing the 
various pressures from the agricultural lobbies and the development advocates, the 
negotiators have not maximized its effect. 
We adopt a limited, but widely used, operational definition of development − the 
reduction in the number of people in extreme poverty − and ask, for a medium-term 
horizon (3-5 years), how different elements of trade liberalization contribute towards this 
goal. We then show that the likely outcomes of the Doha round choose a sub-optimal 
mix. Several commentators including ourselves have observed that the emphasis on 
eliminating industrial countries’ agricultural export subsidies is not particularly poverty-
friendly, because subsidies reduce food prices and many poor people are heavy net 
purchasers of food (e.g. Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga, 2004; Anderson, Martin and 
Valenzuela, 2006, Hertel et al., forthcoming). This result is embedded in the current 
 
 paper, but it takes a distant second place to another problem: the Doha round is set to 
require developing countries to undertake little agricultural trade liberalization and least 
developed ones (the poorest) to undertake none. It turns out that this too curtails the 
ability of the round to reduce poverty in developing countries, despite the fact that among 
negotiating parties it is the developing countries, and their advisors in the development 
community, who are insisting on such exemptions. 
In fact, our results pose and resolve a paradox. Because of the patterns of 
protection involved, our analysis suggests that developing country poverty could be 
reduced both by liberalizing industrial countries’ agricultural trade, which will increase 
agricultural prices in developing countries, and by liberalizing developing countries’ 
trade, which will reduce them. We decompose the effects of the various trade 
liberalizations on poverty into effects acting via earnings, via the replacement of lost tax 
(tariff) revenue and via consumer prices. Developed country liberalization reduces 
poverty via its strong positive effect on the earnings of agricultural factors, which is 
generally not offset by the adverse effects of higher consumer prices. For developing 
countries’ agricultural liberalizations, on the other hand, the earnings effects are mixed 
(partly because some countries export to other developing countries) and the revenue 
replacement effects adverse, but they are generally more than offset by the advantages of 
lower food prices.  
The translation of global trade reforms into changes in poverty involves a long 
and torturous causal chain, which has so far entirely evaded econometric analyses of ex 
post data. The best we have econometrically are studies of specific steps − e.g. Golberg 
 
 and Pavcnik (2003) on employment effects of trade reforms − or of specific events − e.g. 
Niimi, Vasudeva-Dutta and Winters (2006) on Vietnam’s trade liberalization. And yet the 
prominence of the question in global debates means that the economics profession cannot 
legitimately evade the issue altogether. Thus in this and previous studies − Hertel and 
Winters (2006) and Hertel et al. (2007) − we use simulation techniques. We first 
construct plausible scenarios for the outcome of the Doha round, translating them into 
reductions in agricultural support at a very detailed level; from these we use a detailed 
global computable general equilibrium model − GTAP-AGR − to estimate likely effects 
on factor and commodity prices and government revenue in X countries and regions. Of 
these we specialize on fifteen developing countries for which we have detailed poverty, 
factor earnings and consumption data. The latter allow us to calculate the effects on 
poverty across seven strata of households per country of changes in ten factor rewards 
and in taxes and consumer prices. From these we construct a synthesis of likely national 
poverty consequences. The focus countries are based on data availability; they are neither 
randomly selected nor strictly representative of the developing world, but they cover 
three continents and a range of country sizes. Nevertheless, we look for results that re 
robust across this diverse group of countries, so overall we may be fairly confident that 
our findings are informative.  
The basic scenarios and modeling approach in this paper are the same as in Hertel 
et al. (2007). However, whereas that article looked at rich-country income distribution as 
well as poor, and only at the net effects on developing country poverty, here we focus on 
the decomposition of the effects of different policies and the contrast between developed 
 
 and developing country liberalization. It is, we believe, the first systematic attempt to 
look at the poverty dimension of the missing developing country liberalization in Doha. 
We turn now to our analytical framework, which emphasizes the decomposition of 
poverty results into its fundamental determinants. 
Analytical Framework 
The Poverty Model 
There are many alternative approaches to estimating the poverty impacts of trade 
reforms (Winters et al.,2004; Hertel and Reimer,2005). The analytical approach used here 
builds on that of Hertel et al. (2004), which employs a sequential, macro-micro modeling 
strategy in which results from the global model are passed on to a series of micro-
simulation models. Our analysis begins with the specification of a utility function, and an 
associated consumer demand system, with which we can determine household 
consumption, as well as the maximum utility attainable by the household at a given set of 
prices and income. The utility of the household at the poverty line is defined as the 
poverty level of utility. Households with utility at or below this level are deemed to be in 
poverty. In this study, we follow Hertel et al. (2004) in using Rimmer and Powell’s 
(1992a, 1992b, 1996), AIDADS system to represent consumer preferences, due to its 
capability to capture expenditure patterns across the global income spectrum.1 The 
following equation gives the budget share form of AIDADS: 
                                                 
1 AIDADS has now been widely estimated on international cross section data, and it performs well out of 
sample, when compared to other demand systems (Cranfield et al., 2003b). This functional form may be 
viewed as a generalization of the popular, but restrictive, Linear Expenditure System (LES).  Unlike the 
















     
 (1) 
where nλ  is the budget share of good n, nα , nβ , and  nγ  are unknown parameters, u 
represents utility,  is the price of good n, and y is income.  The following parametric 
restrictions are used to ensure well-behaved demands: 
np
1,0 ≤≤ nn βα  for all n, and 










Estimation of this demand system is undertaken using the 80 country, per capita 
consumption data set offered by GTAP, version 6.1 and the resulting parameters are 
reported in the first part of Table 1. The demand system is then calibrated in order to 
permit it to precisely reproduce per capita demands in each country, as illustrated for the 
case of Peru in the second part of Table 1. This country-specific calibration technique is 
detailed in Golub (2006).  
The AIDADS demand system is particularly attractive for poverty analysis, since 
it devotes two-thirds of its parameters to consumption behavior in the neighborhood of 
the poverty line. In particular, nγ  is the estimated subsistence level of demand for 
commodity n, and nα  is the marginal budget share at the subsistence level of income, 
while the remaining n-dimensional parameter vector, nβ , is the marginal budget share at 
very high income levels. So, in the case of staple foods, we observe a non-zero (relatively 
                                                                                                                                                 
of consumer preferences (see also Cranfield et al., 2000, 2003a). 
 
 large) value for both nγ  and nα , whereas the value of nβ  is zero (see Table 1 – where the 
subsistence estimate is reported as a share of expenditure at mean prices and subsistence 
income). Thus, from (1), we see that the budget share for staple foods at low income (and 
hence low utility) levels will be high, whereas it will be low at high levels of per capita 
income and utility. In the case of Peru, for example, expenditures on food and clothing 
account for about 60% of budgets at the $1/day poverty line.  
With the parameters from (1) in place, we can now specify a well-defined 
household micro-simulation model in which households maximize per capita utility, 
subject to a per capita budget constraint, based on the households’ overall endowments: 
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 In this formulation, (2) – (4) define the implicitly additive AIDADS utility 
function with parameters iii γβα ,, and A, and marginal budget share as given in (4). 
Equation (5) is the per capita budget constraint, with income computed as the product of 
, the wage paid, and fW
k
fE , the (fixed) endowment to which this applies, plus any 
transfer payments, which are assumed be a constant share, kT , of net national income, Y. 
Trade reform changes factor earnings and thereby income. When combined with the 
changes in commodity prices, utility maximizing households vary their mix of 
consumption, ikx , and attain a new level of utility. If they were previously in poverty, and 
their per capita utility has now risen above the poverty level of utility, then the poverty 
headcount will fall, and vice versa.  
There are many dimensions through which trade reforms might affect the poor in 
developing countries. In this paper we focus on the poverty headcount – the proportion of 
the population that falls below the poverty line –as a pragmatic way of summarizing the 
consequences of a range of policy reforms across fifteen developing  countries for which 
we have been able to assemble comparable household survey data. These countries are 
listed in Table 1 and together they span the continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
In the aggregate, they account for nearly 1 billion people, and more than 400 million poor  
(measured at the $2/day poverty line; 150 million  poor when evaluated at the $1/day 
poverty line). While they are not a random sample, they do span a wide range of per 
capita income levels as well as differing degrees of industrialization, so , as we will see, 
earnings patterns of the poor in these fifteen countries vary greatly.  
 
 A key finding in the work of Hertel et al. (2004) is the importance of stratifying 
households by their primary source of income. Farm households in developing countries 
often rely on the farm enterprise for virtually all of their income and the share of national 
poverty concentrated in agriculture-specialized households is quite high in the poorest 
countries in our sample – between one-quarter and one-half of the $1/day headcount in 
Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. Not only are farm 
households in the poorest countries more likely to be specialized in farming, these 
specialized farm households also tend to be poorer, on average, than the rest of the 
population (Hertel et al.). The implication of this pattern of farm income specialization is 
that the poorest households in the poorest countries are more concentrated in agriculture 
and therefore more likely to benefit from producer price increases engendered by 
multilateral trade reforms. We follow Hertel et al. (2004) in identifying five household 
groups that rely almost exclusively (95% or more) on one source of income: agricultural 
self employment, non-agricultural self-employment, rural wage labor, urban wage labor, 
or transfer payments. The remaining households are grouped into rural and urban 
diversified strata, leading to seven total strata.2  
Hertel et al. (2004) solve the micro-simulation model given by (1) – (5) for each 
income level in each stratum, at each new price vector. This is computationally intensive 
and the results can be difficult to explain and generalize across countries. Instead, we 
                                                 
2 A clear limitation of this approach stems from the rigidity of a given households’ classification by 
earnings specialization. Obviously households mybe induced to change their specialization or diversify in 
response to changing relative factor returns. We believe that the relatively broad definition of strata 
circumvents this problem for the majority of households in the face of modest earnings changes. However, 
this important qualification will be further considered below in the results section. 
 
 adopt a simpler, highly disaggregated poverty elasticity approach -- which focuses on 
changes in the neighborhood of the poverty line, and which lends itself to analysis and 
decomposition of a complex set of findings, in a relatively straightforward manner.  
Begin with the cumulative density function of per capita income in region r  for 
the population stratum s  : .  Then )(yFrs )(
p
rrs yF  computes the poverty headcount ratio 
when pry is the level of income required to attain the poverty level of utility, 
p
ru ,  in 
region r , at initial prices. Since preferences and consumer prices are assumed to be the 
same across all strata within a given region, this poverty level of income is the same 
across all strata within a given country. We are interested in the elasticity of this poverty 
headcount with respect to a small change in the real income of households at the poverty 













ε = − .   (6) 
Table 2 reports these stratum-specific poverty elasticities for the fifteen countries 
in our sample. They range from a low of 0.0006 in the self-employed agriculture stratum 
in Zambia, where nearly all of the population is well below the poverty line, to a high of 
3.63 in the urban diversified stratum of Brazil, where the population density at the 
poverty line is quite high.  
 
 The proportional change in real income of households at the poverty line in 
stratum  of region s r  can be written as the income–share weighted sum of the 






rs CWy −= ∑α    (7) 
Where  is the share of income obtained from factor prsjα j  by households at the 
poverty line in stratum s of region r ,  is the proportional change in after-tax earnings 
of factor j in region r, and  is the proportional change in the cost of living at the 
poverty line in region r, obtained by evaluating equations (1) – (5) for the level of 
expenditure required to remain at the poverty level of utility.  We can now express the 
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W Cε α= ⋅ ⋅ − )p∑     (8) 
The earnings shares at the poverty line, , will play a critical role in our analysis 
and deserve some discussion before proceeding. Table 3 reports these shares across 
countries for the rural diversified household stratum.
p
rsjα
3 Note that, at the poverty line, 
earnings tend to be dominated by unskilled labor. As the rural households in this stratum 
are diversified in their earnings sources, they often show significant self-employment 
                                                 
3 A complete set of shares for all strata are available in the reviewers’ annex. 
 
 
 income in both agriculture and non-agriculture, as well as unskilled wage earnings. With 
a few exceptions, the earnings shares of agricultural land and capital are negligible, as are 
the skilled labor shares. Transfer payments (both public and private) are an important 
source of income for the rural diversified household at the poverty line in many of the 
regions.   
Having established the determinants of the stratum poverty headcount, we can 
now progress to the national poverty headcount, , which can be expressed as a 
function of the stratum headcounts and stratum populations 
rH
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Here:   
( ) ( ) ( )/ / /rs rs rs r r rs rs rs rs
s
POP H POP H POP H POP Hβ = ∗ = ∗ ∗⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ∑   (10) 
is just the share of stratum s poverty in nationwide poverty in region r. These shares are 
reported in Table 4 for our 15 focus countries. Agriculture specialized households and 
rural diversified households tend to dominate the poverty headcount, although exceptions 
are Colombia, Venezuela and Peru, where self-employed, non-agriculture households 
contain a large share of the poor.  
 
 Combining (8) and (10) we get a useful expression for evaluating the change in 
the national poverty headcount in response to a small change in factor and commodity 
prices: 
( )ˆ pr rs rs rsj rj r
s j
H β ε α= ⋅ ⋅ −ˆ pW C∑ ∑    (11) 
For purposes of subsequent analysis and discussion, it will be useful to further 
separate the tax component associated with the replacement of lost tariff revenue by 
another tax instrument. Hertel and Winters (2006) find that the choice of revenue 
replacement tax instrument can have a significant impact on the poverty results following 
trade reform. Here, we follow those authors in adopting the rather neutral approach of an 
endogenous, uniform factor income tax. Define the uniform ad valorem income tax on 
factor j  in region r as follows:  
m
rj r rj rjTAX t W L= ⋅      (12) 
Where  is the tax replacement instrument operating on market earnings, .  








rjrjrj LWtLWLW −⋅=⋅   ( ) rjmrjr LWt−= 1      (13) rjmrjr LWT=
where  is the power of the source-generic replacement income tax in region r.  With 
fixed endowments, the proportional change in after tax income, is simply given by: 
rT
ˆ ˆ ˆ m
rj r rjW T W= +      (14) 
 
 Substituting (14) into (11) we have the following decomposition of changes in the 
poverty headcount in region r into market earnings, replacement tax, and cost of living 
components: 
( )ˆˆ ˆ ˆp m pr rs rs rsj rj r r
s j
H W T Cβ ε α= ⋅ ⋅ + −∑ ∑    (15) 
Finally, since only relative prices matter in the general equilibrium model, it is 
useful to normalize market wages and the cost of living by a common, national, nominal 
variable that does not vary by stratum or earnings type.  We choose net national income 
in the region (  for reasons that will become clear later on.  Subtracting and adding  
to the term in brackets in (15), we obtain the final decomposition of the national poverty 
impacts of a given change in the trade policy: 
)ry ryˆ
( ) ( )ˆˆ ˆp m pr rs rs rsj rj r r r r
s j
H W y Tβ ε α ⎡= ⋅ − + − −⎣∑ ∑ ˆ ˆC y ⎤⎦    (16) 
Note at this point that the tax replacement and cost of living effects are earnings 
and stratum-generic, so (16) may be simplified as follows: 
( ) ( )ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆp m pr rs rs rsj rj r r r r r r
s j
H W y Tβ ε α ε ε= − + −∑ ∑ ˆC y−    (17) 
where we make use of the fact that ∑ =
j
rsj 1α   and we define the national poverty 
elasticity as the poverty share-weighted sum of the stratum elasticities: r rs
s
rsε β ε≡∑ .  In 
subsequent analysis the first term on the right-hand side of the (17) will be referred to as 
the earnings effect of trade policy on poverty.  It will vary by stratum, and is therefore the 
 
 most complex term in the analysis.  The second term is the poverty effect of tax revenue 
replacement, and the final term is the effect of the changing cost of living on poverty. 
For expository purposes, let us now consider how (17) will be affected by three 
different developments: a rise in the unskilled wage rate, a fall in the power of the tax, 
and a rise in the price of staple foods. Since unskilled wages represent an important part 
of per capita income (recall Table 3), 0prsjα ? , a rise in the wage rate, relative to y, will 
boost income substantially, thereby moving some households across the poverty line. The 
proportional change in stratum headcount will depend on the density of the stratum 
population in the neighborhood of the poverty line, as captured by rsε . If this density is 
high, and the stratum also contains a large share of the nation’s poor, as captured by rsβ , 
then there will be a relatively large reduction in the poverty headcount, ceteris paribus. 
Of course, other factors may change as well. If tariffs are cut, we expect that the income 
tax, , will rise, so that , thereby inducing a rise in poverty. Finally, if trade 
liberalization results in a rise in staple food prices, for which 
rt ˆ 0rT <
0nλ ?  (recall Table 1), 
then we expect a rise in the cost of living at the poverty line, relative to net national 
income, will raise poverty in region r. In light of the fact that trade reforms considered 
here change all the relative prices as well as tax revenues, the decomposition offered by 
(17) is quite important for understanding the underlying determinants of a change in the 
national poverty headcount. 
 
 Having outlined the “drivers” of poverty changes in our analytical framework, we 
turn now to the general equilibrium framework that will determine how these factor 
prices, commodity prices and taxes change as a function of trade policies.  
The Global General Equilibrium Model  
Our starting point for the global, general equilibrium analysis of the impacts of 
trade policy is the GTAP version 6.1 data base (Dimaranan, 2007). Virtually all 
contemporary analyses of the Doha Development Agenda start at this same point. Data 
availability is easily the most limiting resource for global analysis and GTAP version 6.1 
represents the only data base covering global economic activities with bilateral trade and 
protection data that reflects tariff preferences.  This also permits us to draw on the 
carefully constructed Doha reform scenarios developed and utilized in the recent books 
by Anderson and Martin (2006), and Hertel and Winters (2006).4 These scenarios also 
involve a pre-experiment in which key trade policies are updated to 2005, and it is from 
that benchmark that the trade liberalization experiments are undertaken. 
Our modifications to the standard GTAP model focus on features that enhance 
analysis of agricultural reforms and simulation of poverty impacts. We retain the 
simplistic yet empirically robust assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition typically featured in agricultural trade studies.5 The remaining modifications 
                                                 
4 These tariff cutting scenarios are now available on the GTAP web site to those wishing to replicate this 
work. For purposes of this paper, we have used scenarios S0 (pre-simulation with China’s WTO accession, 
EU enlargement, etc.) and S8: the central Doha scenario used in the Hertel-Winters volume. 
5 Francois et al. (2004) introduce monopolistic competition in the manufacturing sector into their analysis 
of WTO reforms. The resulting variety and scale effects generally boost the gains to rich countries and 
dampens the gains to poor countries from rich country reforms. However, this makes their model less 
stable, and, given our focus on agricultural reforms, this feature seems less critical.  
 
 are aimed at permitting us to shed new light on the distributional consequences of WTO 
reforms – focusing particularly on unraveling the puzzle of why the Doha Development 
Agenda is not more poverty friendly.  
On the demand-side of the model, we ensure consistency by modifying the global 
model to incorporate the demand system (1) used in the poverty module. Thus, aggregate 
preferences are consistent with the preferences used to evaluate the impact of price 
changes on households at the poverty line – although expenditure patterns obviously 
differ across regions due to differing per capita income levels.  
The other modifications relate to the factor markets. Ever since the work of T.W. 
Schultz (1945), economists have recognized the importance of off-farm factor mobility in 
determining farm incomes. The limitations of agricultural labor markets have also been 
prominently featured in the development economics literature, as an explanation for the 
very low level of agricultural supply response (de Janvry et al., 1991). Modeling the 
complex processes leading to limited farm/non-farm, rural/urban mobility for the full 
range of countries in our model would be a lifetime project, so instead, we specify a 
constant elasticity of transformation function which “transforms” farm-labor into non-
farm labor and vice-versa. This transformation function permits wages to diverge 
between the farm and non-farm sectors, a key driver for our distributional analysis. We 
apply the same approach to the capital market, postulating a transformation function 
between agricultural and other capital. With segmented factor markets, the impact of 
reduced subsidies to agriculture in the rich economies will not be shared equally between 
the farm and non-farm labor forces or between farm and non-farm capital owners and 
 
 similarly for the benefits from higher farm prices in developing countries following rich 
country reforms. . In order to parameterize these CET factor mobility functions we draw 
on the OECD’s (2001) survey of agricultural factor markets.  
We assume a constant aggregate level of land, labor, and capital employment 
reflecting the belief that the aggregate supply of factors is unaffected by trade policy. 
This is not the ‘full employment’ assumption sometimes ridiculed by advocates of 
structuralist models of development. Rather it assumes that aggregate employment is 
determined by factors such as labor market norms and regulation that are largely 
independent of trade policy in the long run.  
The income sources in Table 3 must be mapped to factor earnings in the general 
equilibrium model in order to make inferences about the poverty impacts of trade reform. 
Agricultural labor and capital receive the corresponding farm factor returns from the 
general equilibrium model, as do non-agricultural labor and capital. Wage labor reported 
in the household surveys presents a problem, since we do not know how much of it is 
employed in agriculture vs. non-agriculture activities. For this reason, we simply assign 
to it the economy-wide average wage – a blend of the farm and non-farm wages. Finally, 
transfer payments are indexed by the growth rate in net national income (the reviewer’s 
appendix offers elaboration on this choice).  
  
 
 Policy Scenarios 
Our attention in this paper is on the developing country poverty impacts of trade 
reforms undertaken in both rich and poor countries. We take these in two stages, focusing 
initially on the poor country poverty impacts of liberalizing agricultural policies in only 
the rich countries. We then contrast this with agricultural trade reforms in the poor 
countries. The latter have proven controversial – particularly with regard to their impact 
on poverty, with some policy makers emphasizing that lowering protection for agriculture 
in developing countries will hurt poor farmers, while others have argued that lower food 
prices will serve to reduce poverty. We will use the poverty decomposition outlined 
above to identify both the earnings and spending sides of the problem, thereupon 
assessing their combined impact on poverty in our sample of fifteen countries. Finally, 
we bring in non-agricultural reforms (in both rich and poor countries) to complete the 
global reform scenarios.  
The Doha scenario considered in this paper derives from the so-called July 2004 
Framework Agreement (WTO, 2004) as embodied in the core scenario from the Hertel 
and Winters volume (2006) and is summarized, along with the other policy scenarios 
considered in this paper, in Table 5. The first column of this table highlights the 
implications for cuts in support in the rich countries’ agricultural sectors – the main focus 
of this paper. This Doha scenario assumes that industrial countries with domestic support 
in excess of 20 percent of production cut their bound commitments by 75 percent, while 
others cut by 60 percent. However, even with these ambitious reductions, the binding 
overhang – the gap between bindings and applied policies - as well as the inclusion of 
 
 market price support concepts mean that effectively only five WTO members would be 
required to reduce actual support, based on 2001 notifications: Australia, EU, Iceland, 
Norway, and USA (Jensen and Zobbe, 2006). Export subsidies are the one area where 
bold cuts (full elimination) are on the table, and we assume this outcome in our Doha 
scenario. When it comes to developing countries (see column two) domestic subsidy 
bindings are cut by 40 percent. In this case, Jensen and Zobbe (2006) estimate that only 
Thailand’s subsidies would be affected. 
Agricultural tariffs in the rich countries are reduced using a tiered formula, with 
marginal cuts changing at 15 and 90 percent bound tariff rates. The marginal cuts are 45 
percent on the first 15 percentage points of the tariff, 70 percent for the range between 15 
and 90 percent, and 75 percent on the remainder.6 For developing countries, the 
inflection points are placed at 20, 60 and 120 percent bound tariff levels in agricult
with marginal cuts of 35, 40, 50 and 60 percent, respective
ure, 
ly.  
                                                
 Of course, cross-sector trade-offs are at the heart of the WTO negotiations, 
so we also consider the impact of non-agricultural elements of a prospective Doha 
Development Agenda. Improved access to rich country manufactures markets, as well as 
access to the markets of other developing countries can have an important impact on the 
demand for unskilled labor, and hence poverty rates in the poor countries. Following 
Hertel and Winters (2006), we focus the attention of our non-agricultural shocks on 
market access (see column three of Table 5), since barriers to services trade and 
 
6 For example, a tariff of, say, 110% is cut by 74.45%: = [15%*0.45 + (90-15)%*0.70 + (110-90)%*0.75]. 
By applying the cuts at the margin we avoid the discontinuities implied by the July Framework. 
 
 investment remain difficult to quantify and those WTO negotiations appear unlikely to 
yield significant changes in the near term. Specifically, non-agriculture tariffs are 
subjected to proportional cuts of 50 percent for developed and 33 percent for developing 
countries. The Least Developed Countries are not required to cut tariffs under this central 
scenario (see Anderson and Martin, 2006).  As a consequence of these relatively 
ambitious tariff cuts in both farm and non-farm trade, average world-wide tariffs for all 
merchandise trade drop from 4.7% in the baseline to 3.2%. 
Throughout our analysis, we employ a macroeconomic closure which fixes the 
ratios of government spending, tax revenue, net national savings, and the trade balance, 
all relative to net national income. This (relatively standard) closure facilitates linking the 
aggregate and disaggregate welfare impacts of trade reform (see the Reviewer Appendix 
for an extended discussion of our closure assumptions and their implications). 
Results 
Agriculture Liberalization by the Rich Economies  
We begin our discussion of model results by briefly considering the macro-
economic impacts of rich and poor country liberalization on our fifteen focus countries. 
These serve as an appropriate prelude to our detailed investigation of the poverty changes 
in these focus countries. Full liberalization of trade distorting agricultural policies in the 
rich countries generates sizable trade volume increases for rice, sugar and beef products 
where border protection is dominant (see Reviewer Appendices). In the coarse grains and 
cotton sectors we observe declines in world trade as output increasing domestic subsidies 
 
 are eliminated and excess supplies are reduced. Under the partial reforms of the Doha 
scenario, full elimination of export subsidies and limited tariff reductions generate 
declining trade volumes in wheat and dairy products.  
These volume changes serve to boost world prices for agricultural products in 
general, and border prices for the developing countries in particular. The resulting change 
in the terms of trade (ToT) is the primary channel through which rich country agricultural 
reforms impact developing countries. If a country is a net importer of food products and 
the world price of food products rises, then the ToT might be expected to deteriorate.  
Table 6 reports the change in focus country ToT and welfare (as measured by the 
percentage change in real private national consumption). Consider first the case of 
Bangladesh, which experiences a 0.5% ToT deterioration under Rich-Agr-Full 
liberalization, and a 0.2% ToT decline under the Rich-Agr-Doha scenario. This is 
primarily due to higher import prices for cotton, wheat and oilseeds. With a deteriorating 
ToT, Bangladesh can afford fewer imports for a given amount of exports, and real 
consumption is expected to decline. On the other hand, Brazil, with a 4.9% ToT 
appreciation, can now consume more imports, or export less and consume more domestic 
production, so its welfare rises.  
Of course, the story is a bit more complex for two reasons. First, in a world of 
differentiated products, there is no single “world price” for a good. Even a commodity 
like rice is differentiated and many different prices can co-exist in the world market at 
one point in time. As a result it matters importantly whether rice is sourced from a 
country whose price is rising, for example due to the elimination of an export subsidy. 
 
 This is the case we observe for dairy imports into Venezuela from the European Union 
and United States. Venezuela also suffers from higher import prices for manufactures 
from Brazil, since the latter country experiences a real appreciation. In short, Venezuela 
is an example of a country that experiences ToT and consumption losses due to the 
country specific pattern of imports. Overall, we find that the ToT deteriorate in seven of 
the fifteen focus countries in the case of full agricultural reform in the rich countries, and 
in eight of the fifteen countries in the case of the Doha reforms. The latter result follows 
from the greater emphasis of Doha on export subsidies to market access.  
The second caveat to the simple “ToT drive welfare” story arises from the 
presence of domestic tax and subsidy distortions. Note in particular, that in the case of the 
Philippines (Rich-Agr-Full) and Peru (Rich-Agr-Doha), the ToT improve, but welfare 
falls. This stems from fact that these countries have domestic tax policies that favor 
agriculture, relative to industry. Therefore an expansion of agriculture at the expense of 
industry has an adverse effect on economic efficiency and overall welfare.  
Now let us turn to the primary focus of this paper, namely the poverty impacts of 
these trade reforms. We make use of the poverty decomposition outlined in equation (17), 
working through this expression from the inside out, beginning with the fundamental 
“drivers” of poverty changes, namely factor prices, tax rate changes and the cost of living 
change, by region. We then translate the earnings changes into poverty changes by strata, 
using the earnings shares and poverty elasticities in (17). Finally, we aggregate across 
strata to examine the national poverty impacts in each region resulting from the effects of 
changes in earnings taxes and cost of living. This approach provides significant new 
 
 insights into the contrasting effects of trade reforms in rich and poor countries, as well as 
Doha vs. Full Liberalization.  
Table 7 reports the change in relative factor returns, cost of living and income tax 
rates, by country resulting from agricultural trade liberalization by the rich economies 
under the assumption of a $1/day poverty line7. We first note that relative returns to 
factors employed in agriculture (land, labor and capital) increase throughout the sample, 
while returns to non-agriculture factors decline. Economy-wide returns to unskilled wage 
labor rise, while those associated with skilled wage labor fall. These results are to be 
expected, since rich country agricultural reforms tend to shift agricultural production 
from North to South, thereby boosting the demand for agricultural inputs and unskilled 
labor in general in developing countries. Observe that the impact on the “earnings” 
associated with transfer payments is zero, as these payments are indexed to net national 
income, which is also used to deflate all earnings types reported Table 7.  
The broad earnings tendencies are neatly summarized across the sample of 
countries by computing the “sign consistency” of a given variable8 (e.g., agricultural 
unskilled wages). This is computed as the ratio of the average to the average absolute 
value of the price change. Since rich agricultural reforms boost unskilled wages in all 
countries, the sign consistency measure reaches its maximum value of 1.0 for these 
factors (see last row in the second block of the Table). On the other hand, when it lowers 
                                                 
7 This assumption for the poverty threshold is maintained throughout our analysis. 
8 Hertel and Ivanic (2005) develop the sign consistency and average absolute value as summary measures 
of cross-region impacts. 
 
 a relative price in all regions – as is the case with non-agriculture skilled wages, the sign 
consistency measure reaches its minimum value of -1.0. The most striking thing about the 
sign consistency of relative factor returns in Table 7 is the great consistency of effects 
across this diverse group of countries. 
The second-to-last row in the second block of Table 7 reports another important 
summary variable: the Average Absolute Value (AAV) of the price changes. This tells us 
how large the price changes are, on average, across our sample of countries. Thus, we see 
that the earnings impact is largest for land, followed by agricultural unskilled labor, and 
then skilled labor and agricultural capital. The absolute size of the impacts on non-
agricultural factor returns and economy-wide wages are much smaller. Thus we expect 
the earnings-driven poverty impacts from rich country agricultural liberalization to be 
greatest in strata where agricultural factors command large earnings shares.  
 The final two columns in Table 7 report the percentage changes in the 
power of the income tax and the cost of living at the poverty line. Since the rich 
agricultural reform scenarios involve no tariff reductions in developing countries, there is 
no need to raise income taxes to replace lost revenue. So the only tax changes are due to 
the interaction between trade, production and consumption volumes and the associated 
taxes. In this case, we see that, in most cases, income tax rates increase slightly, thereby 
reducing the power of the tax. From the next column, we see that the cost of living at the 
poverty line rises in all focus countries, save Malawi. Each of these factors has an 
adverse impact on poverty, ceteris paribus 
 
 For purposes of comparison, we report the summary statistics from the rich 
countries’ partial reforms under Doha9. Note that the SC summary measures share the 
same sign, but are somewhat more muted – i.e. the results are more mixed across the 
focus countries. Similarly, the AAV measures are considerably smaller. As a result, we 
expect the poverty impacts of the rich country agricultural liberalization to be broadly 
similar in sign between Full and Doha reforms, but considerably smaller in size under the 
partial reforms of the Doha scenario.  
Table 8 computes the poverty impact, by stratum, due to the deflated factor price 
changes. These values are the product of stratum specific poverty elasticities and the 
share-weighted change in household earnings (i.e. the share weighted average of the 
earnings sources in Table 7). As expected, poverty falls in all of the agriculture strata, 
while rising in the non-agriculture strata. Due to the importance of unskilled wages in all 
strata and agricultural returns in the diversified strata, earnings-driven poverty falls in all 
the other strata. So we can conclude that, apart from those households specialized in self-
employment in non-agricultural activities, earnings impacts of rich country agricultural 
liberalization are favorable for poverty reduction.  This general finding follows through 
in the following the Doha partial reform scenario as well – albeit with a slightly less sign 
consistency and much smaller AAV. 
In order to determine the national poverty impacts, we must aggregate the 
earnings impacts across strata (weighting the stratum changes by the groups’ share in 
national poverty), and combine this with the poverty impacts of changing taxes and 
                                                 
9 Complete results from Doha experiments are available in the Reviewers’ Appendix. 
 
 consumer prices. Table 9 does so, reporting the national poverty impacts separately for 
earnings, taxes and cost of living changes, in addition to their sum, which is the total 
impact on the national poverty headcount. Earnings changes from rich country 
agricultural liberalization contribute to national poverty reduction in all cases. The rise in 
agriculture-related returns as well as unskilled wages is sufficient to reduce poverty, even 
in those countries where the non-agriculture stratum contains a relatively large share of 
the poor (e.g., Colombia and Peru). The tax effect is negligible as previously noted, while 
the cost of living effect contributes to a rise in poverty in all regions save one (Malawi).   
With the earnings and spending effects working in opposite directions, it is now a 
question of relative size in determining the total impact on national poverty. From Table 
9, we see that the earnings effect dominates in nine of the fifteen cases, and it is 
sufficiently large to boost the SC measure to -0.88 (recall that unanimous poverty 
declines across countries would yield a SC of -1.0). Thus we conclude that full 
agricultural liberalization in the rich countries is poverty reducing on average for this 
sample of countries. In contrast the partial rich country reforms of the Doha scenario 
yield summary measures at the bottom of Table 9, where we find a smaller SC measure 
of -0.55, and an AAV about one-quarter the magnitude of full liberalization. Thus we 
conclude that rich country reforms under Doha are less poverty-friendly than they would 
be under full liberalization, and about one-quarter as large in absolute magnitude. This 
can be attributed to the heavy emphasis on elimination of export subsidies and the 
relatively modest cuts in tariffs and domestic subsidies (Hertel and Ivanic, 2005).  
 
 
 Agriculture Liberalization by the Developing Economies 
Next we consider the impacts of poor country agricultural liberalization following 
the same scheme as the previous section for rich countries. Table 10 reports the impacts 
by underlying “driver” in each focus economy. Note that now it is nonagricultural labor 
and capital, as well as skilled labor, that realize the largest post-reform gains. This is as 
expected, because the tariff cuts are now implemented in the developing countries and 
result in the loss of tariff revenue. The impact on deflated agricultural returns is mixed, 
with substantial declines in some cases, and modest rises in those cases where 
agricultural exports to other developing countries rise as a result of increased South-
South trade. With the exception of agricultural land and transfers (zero due to indexing), 
however, the SC summary measure is positive for all factors. Unlike the previous case, 
the tax and cost of living impacts are now consistent across countries, with income tax 
rates rising (to replace lost tariff revenue) and the cost of living falling as consumers get 
access to food at world market prices (SC = -1.0).  
As before, we aggregate the earnings effects across factors and translate them into 
poverty reductions, by stratum. These are reported in Table 11. The stratum with the most 
consistent poverty reduction is now the set of households specialized in non-agricultural 
self-employment. The other strata show aggregate poverty reductions, but less 
consistently so. Not surprisingly, the largest AAV is for the agriculture specialized and 
rural diversified households as these are the groups most directly affected (on the 
earnings side) by the agricultural tariff cuts. This pattern of poverty reduction presents a 
striking contrast with the stratum impacts of RichAgr reforms. In the latter case, the non-
 
 agriculture stratum consistently experiences poverty increases. So combining agriculture 
reforms in the poor countries with those in the rich countries is quite appealing from a 
poverty point of view since they benefit different segments of the society.  
Table 12 summarizes the national poverty impacts of poor country agricultural 
trade liberalization. The first column represents the poverty share-weighted sum of the 
percentage changes in stratum poverty headcounts from Table 11. Observing Table 12 we 
find that the earnings impacts on poverty, while mixed, are on balance poverty reducing. 
This is somewhat surprising in light of concerns about agricultural tariff cuts on the poor. 
However, the reader needs to bear in mind that these are the impacts prior to tax 
replacement. Once the income tax adjustment is introduced (next column), the earnings 
picture is less rosy. Indeed, in all countries excepting Brazil, income taxes rise and this 
has an adverse impact on poverty. Furthermore, the AAV of the tax rise is nearly half as 
large as the earnings effect, and it dominates the former for several of the focus countries.  
Of course the primary benefit of agricultural tariff cuts with respect to poverty 
alleviation is access to food at lower prices. This effect is evident in the cost of living 
column, where the deflated cost of living falls in all regions except Brazil, where 
increased export demand in other developing countries boosts food prices. The sign 
consistency measure is -0.99 for the cost of living contribution to national poverty 
changes and the AAV measure of 0.82 is even larger than the earnings AAV. The results 
presented in this table demonstrate clearly the beneficial impact of developing country 
agricultural liberalization on poverty, through the lowering of food prices.  
 
 The final column in Table 12 reports the total impact arising from agricultural 
trade reform in the poor countries, taking into account the combined earnings, tax, and 
cost of living impacts. It is striking to note that poverty falls in all but one country. And 
the SC measure of -0.91 indicates that these reforms are even more poverty friendly than 
the rich agricultural reforms in Table 9. On the other hand, the contribution of poor 
country agriculture tariff cuts under Doha, while also poverty friendly, are negligible in 
magnitude, as indicated by AAV = 0.09, which is just one tenth of the AAV for full 
liberalization of developing country agriculture trade policies. 
Table 13 summarizes the poverty outcomes under rich, poor and combined 
(Subtotal Agric. Reforms column) agricultural reforms. Here we see total poverty 
changes repeated from agricultural reforms as reported in Tables 9 and 12, along with 
their combined effect. Given the total impact of agricultural liberalization we see that our 
findings suggest that only Mexico and Uganda would see an increase in the poverty 
headcount attributable to agricultural reforms (due to rich country reforms for Uganda 
and reforms by both country classes for Mexico). Furthermore, the AAV summary 
measure of 1.91 indicating significant movement of persons across the poverty line due to 
agricultural reforms, with the impact of combined rich and poor country reforms 
significantly more important than either one of these sets of reforms taken alone. The 
sign consistency value of -0.93 is also higher than the either of the two sets of reforms 
alone and indicates that global agricultural trade reforms are heavily weighted in the 
direction of poverty alleviation. This outcome is a direct consequence of the fact that both 
 
 developed and developing country reforms reduce poverty – but each tends to do so for a 
different segment of the population; their poverty benefits are complementary in nature. 
Table 14 considers agricultural reforms undertaken under Doha (in the first three 
columns); we find that only seven of the fifteen countries realize a reduction in the 
poverty headcount due to partial agricultural reforms under the postulated Doha scenario. 
The limited poverty reduction impact is reflected in the small (one-third of full reforms) 
value for the AAV of 0.31, and the lack of uniform cross-country reductions of these 
partial reforms is reflected in the more moderate -0.76 sign consistency value (recall that 
under full agriculture reforms this number was -0.91).   
Beyond Agricultural Liberalization  
We conclude the analysis by considering liberalization scenarios that involve 
tariff cuts in non-agricultural sectors in both the rich and poor countries. Adding tariff 
cuts in manufactures leads to significant increases in manufacturing trade under both full 
and Doha scenarios and for both developed and developing countries (see the Reviewers’ 
Appendix for detailed results). Returning to Table 6, we consider now the group of 
columns reporting the aggregate welfare and terms of trade impacts of non-agricultural 
(Non-Ag. columns) reforms. We see very different terms of trade and welfare impacts 
than those stemming from Rich Agriculture reforms only. The terms of trade for the 
focus developing countries fall in more cases (9 of 15 cases), due to the expansion of 
poor country exports in the wake of own and other developing country tariff cuts, as well 
as the erosion of preferences in rich country manufacturing markets. However, welfare 
only falls for six of these countries, with efficiency gains dominating the ToT losses in 
 
 the other three cases (Philippines, Vietnam and Zambia). In contrast, under Global Doha, 
there are fewer ToT losses, but also fewer (and smaller) welfare gains. These mixed 
aggregate welfare effects for developing countries from global trade reforms are quite 
comparable to those reported in other studies of the aggregate impacts of global trade 
reforms on developing countries (Francois et al., Anderson and Martin, Hertel and 
Winters).  
The final two columns of Tables 13 (full reform) and 14 (Doha reforms) report on 
the focus country poverty impacts of non-agricultural reforms and the effect of these 
combined with agricultural reforms. The full reform of non-agricultural tariffs (column 4 
of Table 13) contributes to a poverty increase in the majority of our focus countries. 
However, the AAV of 0.80 is less than the values for rich or poor agricultural full reform, 
indicating lesser absolute impact on poverty, and the sign consistency of 0.23 indicates 
that some of the large effects are actually seen on the poverty reduction side (note the 
importance of the large reduction in Venezuela in this calculation). In Table 14 these 
same impacts are reported for Doha reforms in non-agriculture and we see that the AAV 
is smaller, indicating less impact, but slightly more consistent (SC =  0.32), indicating 
that the impact of the Doha reforms across this sample countries is somewhat less poverty 
friendly than full reform. 
The final columns in tables 13 and 14 report the combined impact of all 
merchandise trade reforms on poverty in our focus countries. The full reforms reduce 
poverty in 9 of the 15 countries, with a Sign Consistency of -0.81 and an average absolute 
value of 1.96.  On the other hand, Doha reforms reduce poverty in only 7 of the 15 
 
 countries, with less Sign Consistency and an AAV only about one-fifth as large. Thus, we 
conclude that the Doha reforms only generate about one-fifth of the poverty change as 
Full reforms, and are considerably less poverty friendly. This stems from the fact that 
both the agriculture and the non-agriculture Doha reforms are individually less poverty 
friendly than the full reforms. 
Conclusion  
This paper has examined the likely poverty impacts of trade reforms under the 
Doha Development Agenda, and contrasted them with the poverty consequences of full 
reform. We expect partial reforms to generate smaller poverty responses than full 
reforms, and indeed we find this to be the case, with lower Average Absolute Values 
(about one-fifth as large) for national poverty changes across our fifteen focus countries. 
However, the two types of reforms are also qualitatively different. This is captured in our 
Sign Consistency measure, which reports how poverty friendly a given reform is, 
regardless of magnitude. By this measure, we judge that full reforms are nearly twice as 
poverty friendly as the Doha reforms.  
There are two factors driving this result. The first is that RichAgr reforms under 
Doha emphasize those elements of policy reform – export subsidies and, to a lesser 
degree, domestic support -- that are less important to developing countries as a whole 
(Hertel and Keeney, 2006), and less favorable to poverty in particular (Ivanic, 2006). The 
latter is underscored by our comparison of the Sign Consistency of RichAgr reforms 
under Doha and Full Liberalization. Less well-understood is the second reason why the 
Doha scenario is not more poverty friendly – it largely omits tariff cuts in the developing 
 
 countries themselves. Our analysis shows that this is the most poverty friendly aspect of 
global trade reform. And it effectively complements the poverty impacts of Rich country 
reforms. While the latter tend to raise food prices, the developing country reforms lower 
food prices for the poor, by reducing tariffs on these products. This generates rather 
widespread poverty reduction. 
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Table 1. Estimated Consumption Relationships: AIDADS Parameters 
Commodity Group International Estimates Calibrated-Peru Subsist Shr MBS-Poor MBS-Rich Subsist Shr MBS-Poor MBS-Rich 
Crops 0.57 0.19 0.00 0.57 0.19 0.00 
Meat, Dairy, Fish 0.00 0.16 0.05 0.00 0.14 0.05 
Food and Beverages 0.10 0.20 0.07 0.10 0.21 0.08 
Textiles and Apparel 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.10 
Utilities 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.05 
Trade 0.04 0.07 0.20 0.04 0.05 0.15 
Manufactures 0.17 0.07 0.15 0.17 0.07 0.18 
Transportation and 
Communication 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.13 0.17 
Financial Services 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.03 
Housing and Public 
Services 0.05 0.08 0.21 0.05 0.07 0.19 




















Bangladesh  1.64 2.02 1.58 0.63 0.56 1.74 1.09 1.24 
Brazil  0.75 1.28 1.94 2.19 0.34 3.63 2.69 1.35 
Chile  1.90 2.24 2.06 1.55 2.45 2.29 2.60 2.18 
Colombia  0.79 0.60 1.73 1.72 0.93 1.14 1.00 0.82 
Indonesia  2.35 2.14 2.38 2.89 1.17 2.58 2.87 2.47 
Malawi  0.49 0.30 2.26 1.97 0.43 1.04 0.76 0.58 
Mexico  1.73 1.90 3.33 2.08 2.28 1.63 1.80 2.02 
Mozambique  0.28 0.94 0.97 0.76 0.48 1.58 0.99 0.64 
Peru  1.50 1.32 2.37 1.73 0.44 1.09 1.05 1.07 
Philippines  2.25 1.96 2.98 2.44 1.69 2.42 1.98 2.15 
Thailand  2.30 2.42 2.98 2.45 2.78 2.42 2.59 2.57 
Uganda  0.28 0.40 1.71 0.34 0.01 0.36 0.21 0.24 
Venezuela  0.69 1.16 2.57 2.17 0.01 1.72 1.53 1.20 
Vietnam  0.48 1.12 2.81 8.98 0.84 0.86 1.01 0.98 
Zambia  0.00 0.64 2.28 0.91 0.45 1.29 0.37 0.61 
Notes: Values in strata columns are elasticities of the poverty headcount with respect to changes in earnings. National 
elasticity in the final column is the poverty share weighted (see Table POVSHR) aggregate elasticity for each country. 
Elasticities estimated by authors using country specific household survey data. 
.

Table 3. Earnings Shares for Rural Diversified Stratum, $1/day 


























Bangladesh 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.43 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.10 1.00 
Brazil 0.00 0.10 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.32 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.41 1.00 
Chile 0.05 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.35 1.00 
Colombia 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.22 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.21 1.00 
Indonesia 0.06 0.32 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.04 1.00 
Malawi 0.03 0.38 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.27 1.00 
Mexico 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.30 1.00 
Mozambique 0.01 0.43 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.20 0.20 1.00 
Peru 0.02 0.20 0.00 0.30 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.14 1.00 
Phillippines 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.30 0.01 0.12 0.08 0.11 1.00 
Thailand 0.04 0.21 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.24 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.35 1.00 
Uganda 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.26 0.14 0.10 1.00 
Venezuela 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.32 0.01 0.28 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.26 1.00 
Vietnam 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.21 1.00 
Zambia 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.43 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.12 1.00 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on household survey data. 
 














Bangladesh  0.15 0.13 0.04 0.22 0.03 0.07 0.37 1.00 
Brazil  0.14 0.09 0.24 0.15 0.32 0.04 0.03 1.00 
Chile  0.26 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.28 0.15 0.12 1.00 
Colombia  0.28 0.43 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.04 1.00 
Indonesia  0.42 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.28 1.00 
Malawi  0.54 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.25 1.00 
Mexico  0.05 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.28 0.14 0.29 1.00 
Mozambique  0.41 0.13 0.01 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.19 1.00 
Peru  0.07 0.35 0.01 0.02 0.22 0.11 0.23 1.00 
Philippines  0.12 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.23 0.49 1.00 
Thailand  0.06 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.68 1.00 
Uganda  0.10 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.75 1.00 
Venezuela  0.08 0.24 0.17 0.10 0.28 0.08 0.05 1.00 
Vietnam  0.04 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.70 1.00 
Zambia  0.34 0.23 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.11 1.00 
Notes: Values are shares of the impoverished population that are specialized in a particular stratum of earnings. Shares 
are derived from country-specific household surveys. Total column reflects that entire poverty population is allocated 
among the seven strata.






























-75% -100% -40% -100%. n.a. n.a. 
Green Box 
Subsidies n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Notes: Doha scenario is derived from Anderson and Martin (2006). Rich agriculture are component reforms undertaken 
in the wealthy countries. Agricultural tariffs are reduced via a tiered formula whereby the first fifteen percentage points 
of an ad valorem tariff are reduced by 45%, the tariff rate between fifteen and ninety percent is reduced by 70%, and 
the portion of the tariff above ninety percent is reduced by 75%. A similar construct is in place for poor country 
agricultural tariffs with the tiers defined at tariff rates of twenty, sixty, and one-hundred and twenty percent. Amber box 
subsidy payments to non-land inputs and output are reduced at two levels: 75 % reductions are required in countries 
where subsidies are greater than twenty percent of producer revenue, while countries falling below this threshold are 
required to reduce subsidy rates by only 60%. Rich country non-agricultural tariffs are assumed to beh halved, 
develping countries’ cut by 33.3%. All full reforms require 100 percent reduction in the tariff or subsidy rate, and 
agricultural export subsidies are fully eliminated in both the Doha and Full reform scenarios. Green box subsidies (area 
and income based payments tied to historical production) are assumed to be unchanged. Least developed countries are 























 ToT U ToT U ToT U ToT U ToT U ToT U ToT U ToT U
Bangladesh  -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 -4.8 -0.7 0.1 0.0 -5.7 -0.6 0.0 0.0 
Brazil  4.9 0.7 1.9 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 -1.8 -0.1 0.1 0.0 3.7 0.7 2.0 0.3 
Chile  0.7 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.0 
Colombia  1.2 0.0 0.6 0.0 -0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -2.3 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1 -1.5 -0.5 0.3 -0.1 
Indonesia  -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.2 1.1 0.5 0.2 0.1 
Malawi  2.6 1.9 0.2 0.2 1.1 1.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.9 0.0 0.0 3.6 3.8 0.3 0.3 
Mexico  -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -2.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 
Mozambique  -0.4 -0.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.6 1.8 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.2 -0.1 -0.1 
Peru  3.2 0.5 0.2 0.0 -0.7 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -1.8 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.0 
Philippines  0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.4 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.3 0.5 0.1 0.1 
Thailand  1.1 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.3 1.5 2.1 0.5 0.5 
Uganda  -0.5 -0.2 -0.6 -0.2 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -1.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.2 
Venezuela  -0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -1.6 -0.2 -0.4 0.0 -2.2 -0.3 -0.7 0.0 
Vietnam  0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 1.1 -0.1 0.1 -1.2 4.5 -0.7 -1.1 -1.2 5.7 -0.9 -1.2 
Zambia  -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 
                 
Average 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 -1.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.9 0.1 0.0 
AAV 1.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.0 1.2 0.6 0.2 0.1 1.7 1.2 0.4 0.2 
Sign Cons. 0.7 0.3 0.3 -0.2 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.9 -0.8 0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 0.8 0.2 -0.1 
Source: Authors’ simulations 
 
 
































Full             
Bangladesh  2.1 1.1 0.9 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.9 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Brazil  41.5 17.7 16.3 -0.6 -1.0 1.6 -0.8 16.2 -1.3 0.0 -0.3 0.8 
Chile  13.5 7.0 6.3 -0.2 -0.5 0.9 -0.5 6.3 -0.6 0.0 0.0 0.7 
Colombia  11.5 5.8 5.1 -0.5 -0.7 0.7 -0.7 5.1 -1.0 0.0 -0.1 1.2 
Indonesia  3.2 1.9 1.5 -0.2 -0.4 0.5 -0.4 1.5 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.6 
Malawi  1.0 0.4 0.1 -0.4 -0.7 -0.1 -0.7 0.2 -0.7 0.0 -0.1 -1.3 
Mexico  11.2 5.0 4.5 0.0 -0.2 0.9 -0.2 4.5 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.9 
Mozambique  2.2 1.1 0.9 -0.2 -0.3 0.2 -0.3 0.9 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Peru  16.9 9.6 7.9 -0.8 -1.2 2.3 -0.9 7.7 -1.3 0.0 -0.1 0.8 
Philippines  3.1 1.9 1.5 -0.1 -0.2 0.8 -0.1 1.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.2 0.6 
Thailand  23.4 12.2 9.6 -0.2 -1.2 3.8 -1.0 9.3 -1.8 0.0 -0.1 1.2 
Uganda  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Venezuela  2.4 1.3 1.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 1.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Vietnam  4.9 2.7 2.3 -0.3 -0.5 0.4 -0.5 2.3 -0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.3 
Zambia  1.8 1.0 0.8 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.8 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 
             
Average 9.2 4.6 3.9 -0.2 -0.5 0.8 -0.4 3.9 -0.6 0.0 -0.1 0.5 
AAV 9.2 4.6 3.9 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.4 3.9 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.7 
Sign Cons. 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 -0.9 0.7 
Rich Agric. 
Doha             
Average 2.2 1.1 1.0 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 1.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 
AAV 2.5 1.3 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Sign Cons. 0.9 0.9 0.9 -0.3 -0.6 0.8 -0.5 0.9 -0.5 0.0 -0.8 0.9 
Source: Authors’ simulations 
AAA is the average absolute value of the data in the column; ‘sign cons’ is the “sign consistency” of the data - the ratio of the average to the average absolute value of 
the variable.
 
 Table 8 Earnings-Driven Percent Change in the Poverty Headcount ($1/day) across 
Developing Country Strata, when Rich Countries Reform Agric. Policies 
 










Full        
Bangladesh  -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 
Brazil  -1.5 0.1 -0.6 -0.5 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 
Chile  -3.5 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -1.0 -0.7 
Colombia  -1.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 
Indonesia  -1.8 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.7 
Malawi  -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mexico  -0.5 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.7 
Mozambique  -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 
Peru  -0.8 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 
Philippines  -0.6 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.6 -1.0 
Thailand  -1.5 0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -0.7 -7.0 
Uganda  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Venezuela  -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vietnam  -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 
Zambia  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
        
Average -0.8 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.7 
AAV 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.7 
Sign Cons. -1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 
Rich Agric. 
Doha        
Average -0.2 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 
AAV 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 
Sign Cons. -0.8 0.8 -1.0 -0.9 -1.0 -1.0 -0.9 
Source: Authors’ simulations 
 
 Table 9. Earnings-Driven Percent Change in the Poverty Headcount ($1/day) across 
Developing Country Stratums, when Rich Countries Reform Agriculture 





Rich Agric. Full     
Bangladesh  -0.46 -0.04 0.39 -0.11 
Brazil  -3.16 0.39 0.97 -1.80 
Chile  -5.42 0.01 1.51 -3.90 
Colombia  -1.28 0.05 0.95 -0.28 
Indonesia  -2.68 0.05 1.40 -1.23 
Malawi  -0.05 0.05 -0.74 -0.74 
Mexico  -1.74 0.12 1.93 0.31 
Mozambique  -0.23 -0.01 0.31 0.07 
Peru  -1.32 0.07 0.85 -0.40 
Philippines  -2.35 0.32 1.27 -0.76 
Thailand  -9.63 0.16 2.84 -6.63 
Uganda  -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.04 
Venezuela  -0.17 0.00 0.42 0.25 
Vietnam  -0.13 0.05 0.31 0.23 
Zambia  -0.01 0.02 0.13 0.14 
     
Average -1.91 0.08 0.84 -0.99 
AAV 1.91 0.09 0.94 1.13 
Sign Cons. -1.00 0.93 0.89 -0.88 
Rich Agric. Doha     
Average -0.46 0.10 0.16 -0.19 
AAV 0.52 0.11 0.31 0.42 
Sign Cons. -0.88 0.92 0.52 -0.46 
Source: Authors’ simulations 
Note: The total results in this table differ from the RichAgrFull poverty  
results in Hertel et al. (2007) since the results in this paper are computed  
as part of a full liberalization experiment using the methodology of Harrison,  
Horridge and Pearson (1999). Thus the results in this table reflect interactions  



































Poor  Agric. 
Full             
Bangladesh  -1.9 -0.9 -0.7 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.7 -0.7 0.7 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 
Brazil  1.9 1.3 1.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 1.1 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Chile  3.0 1.6 1.5 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 
Colombia  -0.7 -0.3 -0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.3 0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.5 
Indonesia  0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 
Malawi  3.7 2.3 1.8 0.2 -0.1 1.1 -0.1 1.8 -0.4 0.0 -0.6 -0.8 
Mexico  -12.4 -5.3 -4.7 0.0 0.2 -0.9 0.2 -4.7 0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.5 
Mozambique  3.4 2.3 2.0 0.8 0.7 1.2 0.7 2.1 0.7 0.0 -0.9 -1.2 
Peru  -1.9 -1.0 -0.8 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.3 -0.7 0.7 0.0 -0.4 -0.5 
Philippines  -2.3 -1.4 -1.0 0.4 0.4 -0.3 0.4 -0.9 0.8 0.0 -0.2 -1.1 
Thailand  3.4 2.4 2.1 0.7 0.5 1.2 0.5 2.0 0.5 0.0 -0.7 -1.2 
Uganda  0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 
Venezuela  -1.6 -0.7 -0.7 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.7 0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 
Vietnam  5.7 3.9 3.6 1.8 1.6 2.3 1.6 3.5 1.4 0.0 -1.5 -1.4 
Zambia  -0.7 -0.4 -0.2 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.7 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 
             
Average -0.0 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.0 -0.4 -0.6 
AAV 2.9 1.6 1.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 1.4 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.6 
Sign Cons. -0.0 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.2 0.9 0.0 -0.9 -1.0 
Poor Agric. 
Doha             
Average -0.09 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 
AAV 0.38 0.20 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.07 
Sign Cons. -0.24 -0.22 -0.18 0.50 0.53 -0.16 0.53 -0.20 0.26 0.00 -0.42 -0.90 
Source: Authors’ simulations 
 
 Table 11 Earnings-Driven Percent Change in the Poverty Headcount ($1/day) across 
Developing Country Strata, when Poor Countries Reform Agric. Policies 
 










Full        
Bangladesh  0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 
Brazil  -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Chile  -0.8 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 
Colombia  0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Indonesia  -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 
Malawi  -0.6 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 
Mexico  0.5 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.7 
Mozambique  -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 
Peru  0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Philippines  0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.6 
Thailand  -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -1.9 
Uganda  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Venezuela  0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vietnam  -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -1.0 
Zambia  0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
        
Average -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 
AAV 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 
Sign Cons. -0.3 -1.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.9 -0.2 -0.5 
Poor Agric. 
Doha        
Average 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
AAV 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sign Cons. -0.1 -0.5 -0.6 -0.2 0.1 0.2 0.6 
Source: Authors’ simulations 
 
 Table 12. Earnings-Driven Percent Change in the Poverty Headcount ($1/day) across 







Poor Agric. Full     
Bangladesh  -0.10 0.56 -0.63 -0.17 
Brazil  -0.15 -0.05 0.05 -0.15 
Chile  -1.36 0.19 -0.24 -1.41 
Colombia  -0.03 0.14 -0.39 -0.28 
Indonesia  -0.30 0.39 -0.92 -0.83 
Malawi  -0.85 0.32 -0.43 -0.96 
Mexico  1.84 -0.15 -1.08 0.61 
Mozambique  -0.78 0.48 -0.78 -1.08 
Peru  -0.07 0.34 -0.50 -0.23 
Philippines  1.36 0.40 -2.33 -0.57 
Thailand  -2.61 1.02 -2.96 -4.55 
Uganda  -0.04 0.04 -0.06 -0.06 
Venezuela  -0.11 0.25 -0.29 -0.15 
Vietnam  -1.42 1.13 -1.42 -1.71 
Zambia  -0.19 0.17 -0.27 -0.29 
     
Average -0.32 0.35 -0.82 -0.79 
AAV 0.75 0.38 0.82 0.87 
Sign Cons. -0.43 0.93 -0.99 -0.91 
Poor Agric. Doha     
Average 0.01 0.01 -0.10 -0.07 
AAV 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.09 
Sign Cons. 0.07 0.56 -0.88 -0.83 
Source: Authors’ simulations 
Note: The total results in this table differ from the RichAgrFull poverty  
results in Hertel et al. (2007) since the results in this paper are computed  
as part of a full liberalization experiment using the methodology of Harrison,  
Horridge and Pearson (1999). Thus the results in this table reflect interactions  
with agricultural policy reforms in the poor countries, as well as non-agriculture  
reforms.
 

















Bangladesh  -0.11 -0.18  -0.29  0.57  0.28 
Brazil  -1.79 -0.15  -1.94  0.53  -1.41 
Chile  -3.89 -1.41  -5.30  0.31  -4.99 
Colombia  -0.29 -0.28  -0.57  0.67  0.10 
Indonesia  -1.24 -0.82  -2.06  0.61  -1.45 
Malawi  -0.74 -0.96  -1.70  -0.14  -1.84 
Mexico  0.31 0.61  0.92  0.43  1.35 
Mozambique  0.07 -1.08  -1.01  0.32  -0.69 
Peru  -0.40 -0.23  -0.63  -0.16  -0.79 
Philippines  -0.76 -0.56  -1.32  0.57  -0.75 
Thailand  -6.63 -4.55  -11.18  2.31  -8.87 
Uganda  0.04 -0.06  -0.02  0.08  0.06 
Venezuela  0.26 -0.15  0.11  0.75  0.86 
Vietnam  0.22 -1.70  -1.48  -4.37  -5.85 
Zambia  0.14 -0.29  -0.15  0.24  0.09 
         
Average -0.99 -0.79  -1.77  0.18  -1.59 
AAV 1.13 0.87  1.91  0.80  1.96 
Sign Cons. -0.88 -0.91  -0.93  0.23  -0.81 
Source: Authors’ simulations 
 
 

















Bangladesh  0.00 -0.01  -0.01  -0.03  -0.04 
Brazil  -0.72 -0.04  -0.76  -0.04  -0.80 
Chile  -0.99 -0.30  -1.29  0.00  -1.29 
Colombia  -0.17 0.01  -0.16  0.06  -0.10 
Indonesia  -0.13 0.07  -0.06  -0.14  -0.20 
Malawi  0.41 -0.06  0.35  0.01  0.36 
Mexico  0.15 -0.13  0.02  0.11  0.13 
Mozambique  0.05 -0.05  0.00  0.02  0.02 
Peru  0.04 0.00  0.04  0.02  0.06 
Philippines  0.02 0.00  0.02  -0.27  -0.25 
Thailand  -1.42 -0.35  -1.77  -0.20  -1.97 
Uganda  0.04 0.00  0.04  0.00  0.04 
Venezuela  0.12 -0.05  0.07  0.14  0.21 
Vietnam  0.14 -0.21  -0.07  0.96  0.89 
Zambia  0.03 -0.01  0.02  0.01  0.03 
         
Average -0.16 -0.08  -0.24  0.04  -0.19 
AAV 0.30 0.09  0.31  0.13  0.43 
Sign Cons. -0.55 -0.86  -0.76  0.32  -0.46 
Source: Authors’ simulations 
 
 
 
